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October 26, 1978
President Jimmy Carter
White House
Washington, D . C.
Re:

DICKEY-LINCOLN WATER PROJECT

Dear President Carter:
First of all, I want you and the staff at the White House to know that I am deeply
appreciative for the input, suggestions and counsel provided ma as Governor of
Maine with respect to the Dickey-Lincoln and related type water projects. As a
matter of fact, very early in my deliberations on this proposed project, which
many feel could either be the best thing to happen to Maine or the worst thing to
happen to Maine for present and future generations of Maine people, I was provided
a copy of a handwritten memo by Governor Jimmy Carter dated October 1 , 1973 as
it relates to the Spewrell Bluff Dam, by some of our mutual friends who felt your
and my approach in matters of consequence and government are similar; as is
the problem you faced and I am now facing with respect to the Dickey-Lincoln Project.
More than coincident ally, I have referred to and read your memo a number of times and
now have it before me and there is also a s i m l a r i t y to the extent of our mutual
experiences. I say this because your very opening sentence in your memo states to
wit: "My decision on whether Spewrell Bluff Dam should be built is one of the
most difficult I have had to make with frthe exception of state government reorganization
which has been the most tune-consuming.
With the exception of the fact that I have
spent much more time on the unfortunate Indian Land Claim than state government
reorganization, my experience has unfortunately been the same as your own experience
as Governor of Georgia.
I too "have personally read all the written reports and transcripts of oral testimony
made available to me" as you indicated in your memo. I too have consulted with many
people and delegations and I too have read and analyzed thousands of letters and
telegrams and petitions and resolutions. I too have traversed the river and area by
foot, by vehicle, canoe, as well as by helicopter. My family, too, has used the
privacy of our homes to receive as well as discuss differing views.
Wnile your memo also indicates "there is no way to win politically because of the
large number of people who insistently and intensely either favor or oppose construction
of this dam," I too have tried to divorce politics from my determination and perhaps
as an Independent Governor not concerned with or seeking re-election or election to
any office, I have had some relief from pressure groups and what you also refer to
as "special interests" to the extent that I have probably been spared some of the
pressure that was applied to you in your decision.
On that note, as you are undoubtedly aware, there is considerable speculation that the
White House is currently directly or indirectly playing "political games" on-this
question by virtue of the fact they have "impounded" or at least "embargoed" the
Final Environmental Impact Statement which was promised as late or as early as August
17th by the Corps of Engineers. However, I want to be extremely fair to the Corps
and specifically to Colonel Chandler who I think has been outstanding and a credit
to the United States Army, the White House and to the people of America. I say this

because you are well aware and one or more mutual friends have told you and I , that the
press frequently reports the Corps of Engineers "plays games" or has been accused in
the past on other projects of having total disregard for the land or the water or the
environment, and that it wants to build projects anywhere or everywhere to justify
its existence and its budget and too frequently proceeds on the basis that "the end
justifies the means." From my standpoint, this type of accusation and criticism is
totally unfair as it relates to Colonel Chandler and the Corps of Engineers regarding
the Dickey-Lincoln Project. I have nothing but commendation as well as pride and
appreciation for the fair method and manner with which Colonel Chandler has treated
the citizens of Maine and this Governor during the course of his studies and hearings
and his responsiveness on the Dickey-Lincoln Project. Therefore, while I do not want
to lend any credence to criticism of you or the White House, I would say that if political
games are being played in withholding the FEIS until after the present election on
November 7th or later, or until there is a new Congressional Delegation and/or Governor
of Maine....I have already received sufficient information relative to the FEIS so that
I feel I am able to make a final decision and my recommendation to you as President.
In other words, even though I am advised there is some unhappiness on 'the part of your
staff with the Corps of Engineers or the FEIS on a Section ^04 problem or sufficient
detail concerning wet lands or fisheries and wildlife, I am advised that they are inconsequential and de minimus as it relates to the total project and the overwhelming facts
and factors that we have already studied. As a matter of fact, based on your previous
expression on water projects and budgetary concerns for waste and bureaucracy and
your excellent anti-inflationary challenge, I cannot believe you would follow any
different approach as Governor of Maine or as Governor of Georgia than I am forwarding
today.
A l s o , more than coincidentally, I share completely and unequivocally the additional
statements contained in your memorandum of October 1 , 1973 on the Georgia project,
which convey rrr/ strong and unequivocal feelings on the State of Maine project, to wit:
"As Governor, as an outdoorsman, as a businessman interested in the optimum economic
development of Georgia (Maine) , and as one who perhaps will make the final decision on
this project, I have tried to assess fairly all factors involved." Very candidly, I
feel this applies equally to the State of Maine - unless you now as President of the
United States apply a different standard to an independent Governor of Maine than you
expected and obviously received from a ?epublican President out of respect to you as
the Democratic Governor of Georgia in 1973.
Another excellent sentiment and quote from your very judicious memorandum demonstrates
once again there is a very strong similarity of resolution as well as in approach between
one Jimmy Carter and one Jim Longley to the extent you also said.
—
"in my mind there is no doubt that I have made the correct recommendation or
decision."
As a former Governor, now the President of the United States, you have also indicated
and I will new reiterate that "it is impossible to analyze in a brief statement all
the complicated and constantly changing issues" ... but you will find enclosed herewith
an in-depth analysis of the major points of consideration and my conclusion, based on
the best expertise provided me and my own analysis and research that
"THE PROPOSED DICKEY-LINCOLN WATER PROJECT, AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED, WOULD BE
GROSSLY UNFAIR TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF MAINE PEOPLE AND A
WASTE OF FEDERAL AND STATE OF MAINE TAXPAYER DOLLARS
AND I , THEREFORE, AS GOVERNOR OF MAINE, DO IN FACT EXPRESS MY OPPOSITION TO
THIS PROJECT AND RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT YOU AS PRESIDENT SUPPORT THIS
RECOMMENDATION."

More than coincidentally, I felt that it would also be inflationary as well as a slapin-the-face and a breach of faith to the voters of Maine for this Governor, or any
Governor of Maine for that matter, to do other than strongly oppose this project as
presently contemplated based on the facts and the overwhelming expression of the voters
of Maine in opposition_to a public power question in 1973. Furthermore, my recommendation
that you deny this project or avoid further waste of taxpayer dollars on this specific
project is based on the following additional specifics:
(1) The voters of Maine in 1973 overwhelmingly voted against public power and at the
very least, a Governor should not approve or even condone or support any effort toward
state or federal public power projects in Maine, in denial of the due process as
demonstrated at the ballot box by the voters of Maine in 1973 , without allowing the
voters of Maine to vote on any public power project, federal or state.
(2) Separate and apart from the public power issue, I oppose this project because despite
very obvious advantages of federal dollars and/or job benefits, the adverse impacts of
"the bust cycle" and the destruction, or at the very least, negative disruption of a
beautiful river plus the land and natural resources combined with a negative social
economic impact on present and future generations of Maine people far outweigh any
present short range economic advantages.
(3) Despite repeated attempts and requests of supporters of the project and despite
diligent research and analysis by independent and state government expertise, I have
been provided with very little evidence, almost totally speculative, that there is any
substantial economic or environmental benefit for the people of Maine once the project
is completed. On the other h a n d , I have given great consideration to an excellent point
made by our mutual good friend, Senator Ed Muskie, to the effect that "once the project
is completed and water starts flowing, it is very unlikely the unit cost(s) will ever
increase."
(4) Despite extensive research and development of cost benefit data as it relates to
present and future energy considerations, there is lack of convincing evidence that
this is the best present form of energy development for the State of Maine and the
region o r the nation as it relates to either long range or short range energy
advantage(s) and/or even a comparative advantage as it relates to the potential for
one or more alternatives in the form of improved conservation, nuclear, tidal, w o o d ,
solar, w i n d , methanol, hydro, including present small dam capability here in Maine,
let alone exciting developments my research has uncovered in the areas of improved
technological and scientific developments in refinery capability, offshore both
surface as well as ocean floor development, predicated on the submarine expertise
and experience with which you are familiar, which could actually lead to ocean floor
refineries and/or communities involved with energy as well as aquaculture development.
Y e s , we have done both our homework and the time spent in research and in studying
this problem is at least the equal of what you indicated directly and I have heard
indirectly you invested in behalf of the people of Georgia. I want you to know that
I have done this not only in behalf of the people of Maine, but by virtue of the
changing energy picture since your decision in 1973. I have also very carefully considered the problem and the potential benefit of Dickey-Lincoln as it relates to the
region and the nation as w e l l , by virtue of the emergence of the^energy program even
though I am not certain I agree with your extreme position that it is "the moral
equivalent of war." However, to the extent your statement was a challenge to America,
then I think Americans - including this Governor - have tried to be responsive and
as Dr. Schlesinger well knows, this Governor was among the first - if not the first t o initially embrace your energy objectives, subject to minor refinements, and I was
also most responsive to the calls from your staff, including Dr. Schlesinger in recent
norths, in seeking the support of the Maine Congressional Delegation and others, for
your program. S o , I am as delighted as you must be to see that the Congress has finally
passed energy legislation.

For your further information and background, I am also sharing with you additional
specifics with respect to the research and thinking and factors we carefully studied
and analyzed in the following areas:
(1) Thousands of Maine citizens have exprssed themselves through numerous forums,
including the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) process on this project.
Additionally, I mnimissioruxl a blue-ribbon panel of: Maine citizens as a project review
coiiinu.tleo to consider the project from the widest possible pors[*>e< t i ve. The State
Department of Conservation, the State Office of Energy Resources and the State DevelopmentOffice have each conducted independent reviews. Finally, I have spoken to hundreds of
Maine citizens and individuals from all over our Country with specific expertise relating
to this project; and personally journeyed to the project site on a number of occasions
to assure a first-hand knowledge of the location and geography before I reached the
conclusions and decisions and recommendation as already stated.
(2) Mr. President, the decisions I have reached are in consonance with Maine's Energy
Plan which provides for developments only when economically sound and environmentally
feasible. The economics of this project are questionable at best. Numerous benefitcost studies have been done, each with a different conclusion. The myriad of possibilities and the overwhelming uncertainties of the 100-year projections precludes
definitive economic analysis and thus leaves one the opportunity to pick his own expert
with his figures to support almost any position. Even the most ardent proponents of
the Dickey-Lincoln project agree that the environmental impact of Maine's land resources
are a major consideration. One land use consultant has estimated that the area directly
affected would be at least 500,000 acres.
(3) I have come to the conclusion that the St. John River may well be essential to our
economic health and energy requirements. However, I am 1 not satisfied that we have in
the Dickey-Lincoln Project the optimum use of the River s resources. Approximately
33% of any power benefit derived for Maine from Dickey-Lincoln would not come from the
project per s e , but from downstream Canadian generation at the discretion of the Canadians
at a cost to be set at some future date. Additionally, Dickey-Lincoln is designed primarily as a.peaking-power project. A Maine-oriented base-load development on the
St. John would be much more important to Maine's long-term economic health than would
the present proposal. I ajn advised that very little if any industrial development
is influenced by peaking power as contrasted by base load power.
(4) We have embarked on serious considerations of several alternate energy sources for
Maine. We are anxious to pursue several viable energy opportunities to reduce our
State's dependence on oil energy. We are convinced that proper integration of the many
diverse sources available to us can provide a solution that will improve the economy
immeasurably without the cost or risk of Dickey-Lincoln. Conservation alone can save
the equivalent of 11,600 ,000 barrels of fuel by 1985. Conservation should not be
viewed as going without or reducing our standard of living or economic growth, but as
an attack on wasted energy. Proper building insulation alone would be a major investment;
however, the results are semi-permanent and significant. A recent study indicates that
56% of Maine homes now use wood in some form for heating. One of Maine's major industries
recently chose to build a wood fuel-fired facility over oil or a hydro-electric plant.
The use of wood for fuel is moving swiftly, and surely now is the time to consider the
implications of 100% use of Maine's timber growth. These and the integrated and proper
use of Maine's existing dam sites, the proper utilization of coal, solar> w i n d , nuclear
and co-generation are urgent considerations. Every day the Maine Yankee Plant at
Wiscasset simply dissipates heat equivalent to 960,000 gallons of N o . 2 fuel into the
river. These alternate sources of energy require an injection of research and implementation effort because they contribute positively to our Balance of Payments and
inflation problems and reduce our dependence on OPEC.

(5) One of the major impacts of this project , and one that has not received
sufficient attention is the devastating impact of the transmission system which
would cut a swarth through some of Maine's most wild and scenic areas and across
free-flowing rivers for 206 miles with a 150 foot right of way and require 4,080
acres.
In addition to the information which we have supplied in this letter, we
have also prepared supplemental data and attachments which will be provided you.
My request, M r . President, is that you will appreciate the integrity of iry decision,
to oppose this project for my reasons as already stated to wit:
"THE PROPOSED DICKEY-LINCOLN WATER PROJECT, AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED, WOULD BE
GROSSLY UNFAIR TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF MAINE PEOPLE AND A
WASTE OF FEDERAL AND STATE OF MAINE TAXPAYER DOLLARS. ..AND I , THEREFORE,
AS GOVERNOR OF MAINE, DO IN FACT EXPRESS MY OPPOSITION TO THIS PROJECT AND
RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT YOU AS PRESIDENT SUPPORT THIS RECOMMENDATION."
Very truly yours,

JBL:bh
cc: Clifford L. Alexander, J r . , Secretary of the Army
James T . Mclntyre, J r . , Director of the Office of Management £ Budget
Charles H . Warren, Chairman, CEQ
Douglas M . Costle, Administrator, EPA
General Morriss, Chief of Engineers
Colonel Chandler, District Engineer
James Schlesinger, Secretary, Department of Energy
Maine Congressional Delegation

ATTACHMENT I

DICKEY-LINCOLN

PROJECT

PROJECT

DESCRIPTION

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

CONSIDERATIONS & CONCLUSIONS
DECISION

PROJECT

DESCRIPTION

As p r o p o s e d , the Dickey-Lincoln School Project would cost approximately
$1 b i l l i o n .

It would consist of two earthfill structures designed to produce

peaking and m o d e s t intermediate load power from the S t . John River

The larger

of the two d a m s , the Dickey D a m , would be located immediately above the confluence
of the Allagash and S t . John R i v e r s .

The Lincoln School Dam would also be located

on the Upper S t . John R i v e r , eleven miles downstream from the Dickey D a m .
The Dickey Dam w o u l d have a total length of 10,600 feet and a maximum
of 335 f e e t .

height

The Lincoln School Dam is considerably smaller and would be 1,600

feet long and have a m a x i m u m height of 85 f e e t .
The p r o j e c t w o u l d be operated p r i n c i p a l l y , although not t o t a l l y , as a
peaking power p l a n t .

The peaking power aspect does not require a high energy

producing f a c i l i t y , it would operate for short periods to m e e t the daily peak
electrical demands of New E n g l a n d .

The initial installed capacity of the project

would be 840 MW with a future potential of 1,210 M W .

The operation of Dickey Dam's

power facilities can vary from 2 ^ hours daily for seven days a week to 3% hours
daily for five days a w e e k .

The large storage capacity of the lake would be

replenished by the spring r u n o f f , metered during the s u m m e r , and reach its lowest
level when drawn down to help m e e t the high winter peak need for electrical

energy

in Mew E n g l a n d .
The Lincoln School Dam can normally operate 10 hours per d a y , seven days a
week.

A l t h o u g h this dam is designed to regulate and even out the S t . John River

f l o w , it also provides some flood prevention b e n e f i t s , as well as base power for
part of Northern M a i n e .
In the e v e n t of an electrical b l a c k o u t , the Project is capable of generating
e l e c t r i c i t y for a c o n t i n u o u s period of up to 35 d a y s .

B u t , under normal

conditions

the P r o j e c t will g e n e r a t e e l e c t r i c i t y only 3 hours a day for 12 months a year

Dickey-Lincoln is designed to supply peaking power to all of New England
via some 400 m i l e s of high voltage transmission lines connecting the Northern
A r o o s t o o k generating plants with the Southern New England load c e n t e r s .

Under

the preference p r o v i s i o n s , under which the power is marketed by the Department of the
I n t e r i o r , small amounts of base load power could be delivered to Maine users served
by M a i n e ' s u t i l i t i e s .
in A t t a c h m e n t

Additional discussion of the "Preference Clause" is provided

IV.

In addition to the description of the Project i t s e l f , I feel there are other
m a j o r factors which should be h i g h l i g h t e d .
(1)

The construction of the Project would m o s t certainly have a economic

impact on M a i n e , particularly Northern M a i n e .

Conservative estimates have placed

the e c o n o m i c impact at $800 m i l l i o n ; it would more likely approach $1 b i l l i o n .
(2)

Construction of the dams would require the displacement of the entire

c o m m u n i t y of A l l a g a s h .
major

The loss of this entire community m u s t be viewed as a

consideration.
(3)

The Project would a c c o u n t for between 15 and 20 percent of the New

England regions peaking capacity requirements by the 1980's.

H o w e v e r , the Project

w o u l d account for less than three percent (3%) of the total energy requirements
of the r e g i o n .
(4)

A p p r o x i m a t e l y 88,000 acres would be flooded by the P r o j e c t , and a

D e p a r t m e n t of Conservation study indicates that an additional 205,000 acres of
f o r e s t land would be isolated from Maine wood markets to the extent that access
and egress would be through Canada for the m o s t p a r t .

New transmission line rights-

of-way and associated a c c e s s roads would require another 4,083 a c r e s .

These figures

c e r t a i n l y indicate that the Project has a m a j o r impact on Maine land r e s o u r c e s , all
of which are now p r i v a t e l y owned and would be subject to eminent domain

seizure.

/

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

T h e re is little Question b u t that the construction of the Project w o u l d
have a m a j o r , adverse environmental

impact-

There appears to be little dispute

in this a r e a , even from the most ardent proponents of the P r o j e c t .
O v e r a l l , from the s t a n d p o i n t of the stability and productivity of the
e x i s t i n g natural e n v i r o n m e n t , the Project will clearly have an adverse i m p a c t .
One consultant has e s t i m a t e d that due to the shape and location of r e s e r v o i r s ,
the e f f e c t on roads and m i l l s , acreage for mitigation of w i l d l i f e h a b i t a t ,
d a m s , transmission lines and access r o a d s , the area directly affected is at
least 500,000 a c r e s .

In a d d i t i o n , there will be adverse impact on a beautiful

and aesthetic river and land, as well as some unfavorable impact to future
productivity of m a j o r acreage of commercial forest land due to the impoundment
and b u f f e r z o n e , transmission lines and isolation.
The Project w o u l d , in addition to despoiling one of the few remaining real
w i l d areas and free-flowing rivers in the Eastern United S t a t e s , also w o u l d
unfortunately have transmission lines cross primitive wild areas and rivers in
Northern M a i n e , as well as create a ditch-type environment on beautiful

fields,

countryside and areas bordering some of our m o s t beautiful towns and recreation
and wi Idlife areas .
Some of the m o s t productive forest lands in the watershed occur within the
area are to be i n u n d a t e d .

88,000 acres w o u l d be flooded by the p r o j e c t .

New

transmission line right-of-ways and access roads would require 4,083 a c r e s .

13,400

acres of forest land w o u l d e x i s t as i s l a n d s , being less accessible for h a r v e s t i n g .
An additional 206,000 acres of forest land w o u l d be isolated from Maine w o o d
industry m a r k e t s .
White w a t e r canoeing and wilderness camping w o u l d be adversely
if not in fact d e s t r o y e d , in the Project a r e a .
recreation attractions will

impacted,

The new benefits from man-made

largely depend on the investments in facilities such

as c a m p s i t e s , b e a c h e s , nature t r a i l s , e t c . , and the vagaries of the lake fishery.

CONSIDERATIONS E V A L U A T E D AND CONCLUSIONS

(1)

REACHED

A decision on this Project cannot be reached solely on the basis of

economic considerations.

We do not have a r i g h t , in this g e n e r a t i o n , to commit

a s i g n i f i c a n t portion of our valuable w i l d e r n e s s land to a project based solely
on the fact that it will temporarily stimulate the economy by a construction
boom because the risk to future generations of a bust cycle far offsets the potential
long-term value of the boom c y c l e .

A d d i t i o n a l l y , the Project certainly could not be

j u s t i f i e d by the number of p e r m a n e n t jobs it would c r e a t e .

F i n a l l y , analysis of the

several proposed c o s t - b e n e f i t computations with their several d i f f e r e n t interest
r a t e s , the m y r i a d of possible c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and the overwhelming

uncertainties of

one hundred y e a r s , precludes d e f i n i t i v e or accurate economic analysis and thus

leaves

one the o p p o r t u n i t y to pick and c h o o s e at will a set of figures supplied by one's
favorite e x p e r t to s u p p o r t almost any p o s i t i o n ,
(2)

(see A t t a c h m e n t II )

The Project should not be rejected solely on the basis that it would

r e p r e s e n t a loss of scenic or w i l d e r n e s s areas to be used by present and future
g e n e r a t i o n s for recreation
(3)

purposes.

M a i n e m u s t assume the responsibi1ity of providing a fair share of the energy

needs of the state and the n a t i o n .

Statistics show that Maine has been providing its

fair share of electrical e n e r g y in New England and we m u s t continue to make this s o .

DECISION
(1)

T h e federal g o v e r n m e n t is still struggling to develop a clear energy policy and

d i r e c t i o n ; and it simply is n o t reasonable to suggest that Maine endorse the DickeyLincoln P r o j e c t in this v a c u u m .

To do so would not be unlike placing one tiny p i e c e of a

large and complex puzzle on a table and waiting to see if the unknown parts will
ultimately fit.
(2)

M a i n e will continue to assume its full responsibility to shoulder its fair

share of the energy burden w i t h o u t undertaking this project at this t i m e , which w o u l d

have,

as I view i t , minimal returns for a m a x i m u m s a c r i f i c e .
(3)

I have stated on many occasions that I do not feel any individual or group

has the luxury to oppose each and every energy proposal on environmental grounds w i t h o u t
providing v i a b l e alternatives to the energy p r o b l e m .

We do not have a right to say w h a t

w e are a g a i n s t w i t h o u t saying w h a t w e are for so that realistic trade-offs and viable
c o m p r o m i s e s can be r e a c h e d .
T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e I oppose the construction of the Dickey-Lincoln P r o j e c t , I will
s u p p o r t for the remainder of my term as G o v e r n o r , and as a future private c i t i z e n , the
following:
(1)

Continued planning and construction of Maine's base-load generating

capabilities.
(2)

A c c e l e r a t e d resource and development of the construction of additional

f a c i l i t i e s with reasonable safeguards relating to safety and w a s t e d i s p o s a l s .

nuclear

In that

r e g a r d , I am on this date advising all concerned state departments and agencies of the
u r g e n c y of the energy p r o b l e m , the need to expedite and shorten long lead-times and to give
p r i o r i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n , wvthjji the scope of Maine's existing l a w s , to requests for permits
and l i c e n s e s .

I am convinced that Maine can continue to produce its share of base-

load e l e c t r i c i t y w i t h o u t endangering its unique e n v i r o n m e n t .

(3)

I am this date directing the Office of Energy Resources to accelerate their

p r o g r a m s to develop a l t e r n a t i v e solutions to have Maine provide its fair share of "peaking"
capabilities.

This should include progress reports on the utilization and impact of a

series of smaller hydro projects on Maine's r i v e r s , tidal p r o j e c t s , nuclear p r o p o s a l s ,
and pumped storage possibilities with a formal plan to cooperate with private utilities
on a c o n s e r v a t i o n p r o g r a m , particularly during peak periods in Maine or during periods
when M a i n e should conserve to accommodate peaks in other areas of New E n g l a n d .
(4)

Should there be continued efforts in the future to proceed with the

Dickey-Lincoln P r o j e c t , I would ask the Maine Legislature to take whatever action is
necessary to see that all the citizens of the State of Maine are given an opportunity
to express their opinions on the Project at the ballot box.

In making my own decision

to o p p o s e the P r o j e c t , I could not ignore the fact that as recent as N o v e m b e r , 1973,the
people of M a i n e w e r e given the opportunity to speak to the Public Power issue and they
o v e r w h e l m i n g l y d e f e a t e d . . . .at the ballot b o x .

.a Public Power r e f e r e n d u m .

Construction

of the Dickey-Lincoln Project by the U . S . Army Corps of Engineers to be operated by a public
a u t h o r i t y c o u l d , in e f f e c t , be a backdoor approach to bringing Public Power to Maine to the
e x t e n t that it establishes a New England Public Power Project at the expense of Maine
landowners and both federal and state taxpayers.

That being the c a s e , I consider it only

r e a s o n a b l e and appropriate that the citizens of Maine would at the very least be given the
o p p o r t u n i t y to reverse this expression prior to any support at the State level

No public

official should c i r c u m v e n t the position of a majority of the people of a state once it
has been expressed at the ballot b o x .

A s u m m a r y of Pros and Cons for many of the elements considered in reaching this decision
is c o n t a i n e d in A t t a c h m e n t

II.

ATTACHMENT II

DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT

Decision Matrix
Summary

Pros and Cons

AREAS OF CONCERN
A.

B.

C.

D.

Energy Economics
a.

Energy Demand

b.

Energy Alternatives

c.

Construction Economics

d.

Marketing

Community and Economic Impacts
a.

Relocation

b.

Job Impacts

c.

Flood Control

Environmental Impacts
a.

Terrestrial Ecosystem

b.

Forest Resources

c.

Wildlife

d.

Fisheries

e.

Recreation

f.

Land Uses

g.

Geology and Safety

Conservation

AREAS OF CONCERN
A.

ENERGY ECONOMICS

This summary is heavily dependent upon the energy analysis for the DickeyLincoln School Project prepared by Acres-American Inc. under contract with the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.
Reports indicate that, in the absence of major changes in lifestyles, the capacity
of the Dickey-Lincoln project may be needed in the 1980's Sub-Section a presents the
pro and con arguments in the area of ENERGY DEMAND.
Sub-Section b considers the following Energy Alternatives:
Dircct Generation
Nuclear-Steam Cycle
Conventional Fossil Thermal Steam Cycle
Gas Turbines
Hydroelectric
Combined Cycle
Power Purchases
Solar Wind
Small Hydro
Tidal
Energy Storage
Conventional Pumped Hydro
Lead-acid Batteries
Compressed Air Storage
It is important to note that, although Dickey-Lincoln is a peak load plant, both
peak load plants and base load plants when combined with a storage capability can be
considered alternatives to Dickey-Lincoln. Geothermal sources were rejected because
of unproven resources and economics in the New England area. Advanced nuclear cycles
such as the "breeder reactor" were excluded since they are not likely to replace the
c onventional reactor in the U.S. nuclear scene before 1990 and fusion applications
probably not 'til the turn of the century.
SUB-SECTION c , CONSTRUCTION ECONOMICS, reviews the findings of the economic analysis
for the project and presents the controversies regarding the methodologies used by
the Corps in undertaking the economic assessments of the project.
SUB-SECTION d , MARKETING, reviews the marketing and strategy for power, the allocation
of a portion of the base load power to Maine, most of the peaking capacity to southern
New England and concerns with the "Preference Clause"

*NOTE:
Pro and con statements address specifically the sub-headed subject
per se.

A.

ENERGY DEMAND

ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued)

Pros

Cons

1.

NEEPOOL projects that power demands
in New England will grow at 5.4%
annually indicating a need for
peaking power such as could be
provided by the Dickey-Lincoln
Project. The New England Regional
Commission energy project made a similar
projection. An alternative
projection by the Corps consultant
reported an annual growth
rate of 5.2% which also indicates
a future need for Dickey-Lincoln
energy.

2.

The project would account for between
15 and 20 percent of the New England
regions "peaking capacity" requirements by the 1980*s.

2.

The project would account for less
than 3% of the energy requirements c
the New England Region.

3.

Private power projections
indicate that Maine will need
additional pcwer - both base load
and peaking by the time DickeyLincoln is on line.

3.

Maine exports power. The project is
for New England benefit - Maine does
not need it.

1.

All forecasts are based on industry
figures and may not be an accurate
measure of what capacity is actually
needed in the future. An independent assessment of future demand
is needed.

Industry is not interested in peak
power. New industry is induced by
a significant differential in the
cost of base power.
4.

Load Management and Conservation
can reduce generating capability
requirements, however, that
reduction in capacity requirements will not eliminate the
need for additions to the system
based upon future demand
requirements. In addition,
Load Management depends upon
changing State laws (PUC regulations) .

4.

Load Management and serious
Conservation efforts could reduce
the need for future peaking power
and, therefore, Dickey-Lincoln.

5.

The public and industries expect
government and utilities to
assure an energy supply with
minimum impact on living standards.

5.

Approximately 33% of any base power
derived for Maine would not come
frcan the project but from downstrear
Canadian generation at the
discretion of the Canadians where
no treaty or agreement exists to
assure an economical and continuous
supply.

6.

Many households shifting to wood are
installing electricity as a backup
source of heat.

b.

ENERGY ALTERNATIVES

i-

A . ENERGY ECONOMICS

(Continued)

Nuclear and Conventional Fossil
Thermal Steam Cycle Alternative
Pros

Cons

1.

Both nuclear and conventional fossil
thermal steam plants are designed
for base load pcwer generation. These
plants operate most efficiently at
fixed and continuous levels of
operation as opposed to the intermittent operation of peaking plants.
It is prohibitively expensive to
regularly vary the level of output
at these thermal steam plants
or to build a thermal steam plant
primarily as a peak load plant.

1.

Although nuclear and fossil fuel
cannot be considered as direct
alternatives to Dickey-Lincoln as
peak power plants, they must be
considered as one component in an
alternative mix. Nuclear and fossi.
fuel base plants can produce off
peak power to be stored for use
during peaking periods. The storage
options include conventional pumped
hydro, lead-acid batteries,
compressed air storage and
underground pumped hydro. Each of
these is discussed separately in
the section on power storage
alternatives.

2.

Whether or not these base load plants
can produce off-peak power to be
stored and sold during peak periods at
prices competitive with DickeyLincoln over the long run is not
certain.

2.

The uncertainties here relate to
the future price and availability
of oil, coal, and uranium; and to
the technological developments in
in the breeder reactor.

3.

Nuclear energy is, and must be, a
component of the nations energy
supply. The Maine Yankee facility
has been immensely successful.

3.

Nuclear wastes are a national
responsibility and proper storage
must be rapidly demonstrated
along with a better understanding
by the public of nuclear developments.

4.

The Maine Yankee nuclear power facility
at Wiscasset, Maine generates 10 times
the power of the proposed DickeyLincoLn project with no appreciable
environmental impact.

ENERGY ALTERNATIVES
ii.

(cont.)

A.

ENERGY

ECONOMICS

(Continued)

Gas Turbines Alternative

Gas turbines were found to be more
expensive than Dickey-Lincoln. They
are expected to be even more so over
the long run as the price of the fuel
(Oil) for the gas turbines continues
to increase.

The Acres-American Study found Gas
Turbines to be an alternative to
Dickey-Lincoln. The Citizen' s
Impact Review Committee concurred.
Although Gas Turbines are more
expensive than Dickey-Lincoln, the
environmental problems are generally
minimal.

Gas Turbines run on an oil-based
fuel.

Gas Turbines can be constructed
near the load center to minimize
transmission losses and the need to
construct new transmission systems.
Oil-based fuel is subject to OPEC
vacillations and also impacts
adversely on balance-of-payments and
national inflation problems.

iii. Conventional Hydro with Storage Capacity
for Peaking Alternative
Pros

Cons

1.

The benefit to cost ratio for these
alternatives was in no case more
than one.

According to the U.S. Army Corps
consultant, approximately 1,000 MW o
capacity is available from six New
England hydro sites with individual
capacities of 90 MW or more. In
terms of the amount of peaking power
this is an alternative to DickeyLincoln.

2.

Of the six sites mentioned only one
(Cold Stream, CMP) is being given
serious consideration by the Private
Sector.

The benefit to cost ratio of
Conventional Hydro is only mildly
subject to inflation.

3.

These relatively high capacity hydro
facilities (needed to generate
peaking power) would require impoundments inevitably causing a disruption
of the natural ecology of the water
course and surrounding area. These
environmental impacts although more
dispersed, could be as significant
as those of the Dickey-Lincoln Project

iv.

Combined Cycle Alternatives

1

Combined cyclc plants utilize oil as
fuel.

1.

Combined cycle plants (combine gas
turbines and conventional thermal
stc£im plants) have a very good load
following capacity.

2.

The gas turbine is more competitive
in producing peaking power.

A

^ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (cont.)
'
v.
Power Purchases Alternative
1.

ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued)

Depending heavily upon purchased
power is uncertain over the long
run. Since hydropower development
in Canada is publicly funded, it is
likely that Maine would lose this
power as Canadian demand grows over
the long run. There is no data
at this point on the price at
which this power would be
marketed. Is it certain that
the Canadians will build the Dam and
construct transmission lines which
could efficiently transport the
power to Maine.

1.

New England can purchase capacity
from outside the region to meet its
needs. The Canadian government
intention is to pursue the Gull
Island Hydro Project on the lower
Churchill River in New found land
indicates a- potential source of
peaking capacity for Maine.
It is possible that Maine might
be able to purchase firm
capacity from this $3 billion
project which is expected to
provide surplus capacity to
Canada.

2.

In August, Vermont announced
the conclusion of a tentative
agreement with Quebec for the
purchase of at least 55 megawatts of power for a period of
20-30 years. The price yet to
be negotiated, but with
deliveries starting perhaps as
early as 1981. Vermont's
Electric Power Authority has
indicated it could also carry
Quebec's electricity to other
American states.

^Additional aspects relating to Canadian Power purchases is contained in Attachment V I .

ENERGY ALTERNATIVES

vi.

(cont.)

A.

ENERGY ECONOMICS

(Continued)

Solar Alternative
Pros

1.

The most efficient application of
solar energy is in the heating and
cooling of buildings.

2.

Solar energy will not produce dependable peak load power.

3.

Solar energy is not particularly
suited to the New England Region.

Cons
1.

The application of solar energy, although
limited, is growing steadily and is
relatively expensive.
Solar energy could be used to produce
off-peak power which could be stored.

vii. Wind Alternative
1.

Wind is not a reliable source of
power. The amount of wind that
can be produced at any moment
is unpredictable.

1.

Wind considered in conjunction with a
storage system could be a reliable
source of power.

2.

Capital cost of wind generators are
high and the maintenance costs are
yet undefined.

2.

The economics are still uncertain.
Wind power could become competitive
as the various sources become more
expensive.

1.

President Carter's National Energy
Policy and the Army Corps of Engineers
have indicated that there are a number
of sites for small hydro
that
be utilized for energy
production.

viii.
1.

* Small Hydro Alternative

Small hydro (run of the river) does
not have storage capacity and would
not be a viable alternative for
winter peaking power.
* S e e A t t a c h m e n t VII f o r d i s c u s s i o n of
small hydro alternative for Maine.

ix.

Tidal Alternative

1.

A t this time Passamaquoddy is not
as cost-effective as Dickey-Lincoln
according to the Army Corps
of Engineers.

1.

Tidal power in Passamaquoddy and Cobscook
Bays in Maine, looked at over the long
run, is an economic source of power. A
recent life-cycle analysis of the
Passamaquoddy project indicates that
the project could well be economically
feasible. It is still being studied
by the Corps.

2.

Periods of peak generation for
tidal plants depend upon the
tides and frequently do not
correspond with periods of peak
demand.

2.

Double-effect schemes for tidal projects
can be designed to provide sane firm
peaking capacity at an increased cost.

3.

Double effect scbemos require the
sacrifice of some energy benefit
to achieve some firm peaking capacity.

3.

Large-scale tidal projects have major
environmental impacts.

A.

ENERGY

ECONOMICS

(Continued)

ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (cont.)
Conventional Pumped Hydro Alternative
Pros

Cons

Because of pumping and generating
inefficiencies there is a net loss
in energy production from pumped
storage. A pumped storage plant
normally generates only 65 to 75
percent of the energy used for pumping.

A total of 52 potential sites for
conventional pumped storage ranging
in size from 275 MW to 7930 NW have
been identified in New England.

The pumping energy cost evaluation
was based on variable unclear fuel
costs of 3.6 mills per KWH and
variable O&M costs of .15 mills
per KWH. These pumping costs will
increase in the future inflating the
cost of pumped storage. There is also
the question of whether low cost
base load power will be available for
New England in the late 198O's.
This is an uncertainty at the
present time.

If the cost calculations for Site Leo
were done on an equal basis with
Dickey-Lincoln (i.e., same interest
rate and insurance costs) Site Leo could
well be more competitive.

3.

The cost of pumped hydro was not
determined on a site specific basis.
They were based on averages and
cannot therefore be considered as
dependable estimates for individual
sites such as Site Leo in Maine.

The economy of pumped storage results
from the conversion of low-cost, offpeak energy to high value peak energy.

4.

Pumped hydro in Maine would require
an excess base load power frcm
nuclear or fossil fuel generating
stations.

The environmental impact is minimal.
A number of the pumped storage sites,
including Site Leo in Maine, have the
same capacity as Dickey-Lincoln but
have much less an environmental impact
at the site of the dam. Site Leo
has 1,000 MW capacity and only floods
3,385 acres as opposed to DickeyLincoln with an installed capacity of
830 KW impacting on hundreds of
thousands of acres.

\

A.

ENERGY ECONOMICS

(Continued)

ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (cont.)
xii. liead-acid Batteries Alternative
Pros

Cons

1.

The economics of battery storage
like all other storage alternarequire a supply of low cost
off peak energy.

1.

The lead-acid battery is predicted
to be commercially available in plar
as large as 800 MW with up to 10
hours of storage by about 1990.

2.

Assuming mass production, capital
costs are eventually expected to be
competitive with conventional energy
storage systems such as pumped hydro.

2.

At the present time batteiv storage
is more expensive than conventional
pumped hydro.

3.

Battery plants can be located near the
load center, therefore diminishing
the need for transmission lines and
decreasing transmission losses.

3.

Environmentally, there are potent^vi
problems with battery plants
associated with the ultimate dispos£
of spent electrolyte and the danger
of accidental spillage.

1.

The economics of compressed air
storage has yet to be proven and it,
as other storage systems, depend on
the availability of excess base load
power.

1.

A public attitude must be developed
that conservation is not doing
without, but using energy efficientl
so that we can do more with less
and eliminate all waste.

xiii.

Coirpressed Air Alternative

1.

The worlds first plant is currently
under construction in Germany.

2.

Research indicates that compressed
air storage systems can be developed
with installed capacity of between 2,000
and 3,000 MW.

xiv.

1.

Conservation

The State Office of Energy Resources
has calculated that optimum conservation
measures in Maine can save, by 1985, an
annual equivalent of 11,600,000 barrels
of Number 2 fuel oil. Savings in space
heating alone by reducing Maine thermostats to 60° would save approximately
1,680,000 barrels of Number 2 fuel oil
which is approximately 80% of the total
annual production of the Dickey-Lincoln
project.

A.

ENERGY ECONOMICS (continued)

CONSTRUCTION ECONOMICS
Pros

*

Cons

1.

The cost benefit ratio of the
project as calculated by the Corps
is 2.1 to 1 based on an interest rate
of 3 1/4%.

1

The interest rate of 3 1/4% is
inappropriate and a higher rate
could make the project unfeasible.

2.

The Corps calculated the cost benefit
ratio to be 1.2 to 1 at the 6 3/8%
Federal funds rate of interest used
for other Federal Water Projects. The
Corps favorable cost benefit ratio
incorporated power from downstream
Canadian generation; and there is no
cost or treaty agreement to assure
a continuous economical supply.

2

Even the 6 3/4% is perhaps too low,
as government projects are not
subject to taxes, and therefore,
the true cost is understated.

3.

The true benefits of Dickey-Lincoln are 3
very significantly understated because
the benefits of the project are measured
in terms of fixed prices for alternatives. If the benefit cost analysis
recognized that the cost of alternative
non-renewable sources of power will
increase but the non-capital costs of
Dickey-Lincoln are nearly fixed (which
is certainly realistic) then the
benefit cost ratio for Dickey-Lincoln
over the long-run could be overwhelmingly positive.

Federal benefit to cost assessments
are done with fixed prices. DickeyJuLncoln should be, as well. Electricity produced from hydro power
will increasingly become cheaper to
produce as oil and gas supplies
dwindle and nuclear and coal costs
rise to meet safety and antipollution requirements.

4.

From a purely economic point of view,
the project construction will be
beneficial to Maine.

One consultant used the 8 1/2% rate
which more closely approximates the
market prime interest rate in mid1978. This produces a benefit-cost
ratio of .95 to 1. Eliminating
project credits for re-development
and downstream benefits for the
reduced ration to .87 to 1. The Federal
Power Commission makes a further
adjustment of 5.1% for taxes. This
would further reduce the ratio to .67
to 1.

4

See Attachment VIII for the computations of Professor Lawrence G . Hines,
Dartmouth College; Hanover, NH

d.

*

A.

ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued)

PROS

CONS

MARKETING
Maine is scheduled to receive 44% of
the total energy procuded by the project:

Maine will receive only 22% of the
capacity of the project. Approximately 33% of the power benefit
derived for Maine would cane frcm
downstream Canadian generation for
which there is no agreement
regarding cost of delivery.

The intermediate pcwer will be available
for Maine.

This intermediate po^er will not
eliminate the need for new
generating capacity for Maine, nor
will it provide the significant
cost differential necessary to
attract industry.

In addition to the pcwer generated by
the project, 175 killowatt hours of pcwer
could be available from arrangements are
pursued.

There are no treaties or guarantees
that any part of the Canadian po.v- r
will be made available in the
United States at reasonable prices.

* Preferences Clauses for the sale of
Federal power require that first
preference in marketing be given to
cooperatives and municipals. The largest
cooperative is in Washington County which
is not a prosperous County.

The project espouses the development of public power overwhelmingly
rejected by Maine voters.

NEPOOL members (private utilities
England) who formally opposed the
the past now have taken a neutral
the project, recognizing the need
peaking power in New England.

The NEPOOL private utilities are
concerned that if the Preference
Clause is not modified, they will
not be able to utilize DickeyLincoln power for their customers.
Under the Preference Clause,
cus tamer-owned cooperatives and
municipals would have first
preference for the power.

in New
project in
position on
for future

See Attachment IV for further discussion of the "Preference Clause

1,

B.

COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS

If the Dickey-Lincoln School Project was constructed, families would be
displaced fron their hones, forest industry jobs would be lost, and scrne dislocations
would take place in the agricultural sector. However, the area would experience
eight years of economic boom. Sixty-eight permanent jobs would be created. The
Upper St. John River would benefit frcm flood control. This Section looks at
Corrmunity and Economic impacts of the project in irore detail. The information and
ideas presented here lean heavily upon the Department of Conservation's analysis
of the project, E.C. Jordan's work as a consultant fo the Army Corps of Engineers
on the project, as well as the work of numerous consultants and specialists
in related fields.
a.

RELOCATIONS
PROS

1.

CONS

The 161 families would be relocated at
Federal government expense, considering
the area flooded this is a relatively
small number of people to be dislocated,

1.

161 families from the Allagash
area will be uprooted by the
project. The community life of
these people would be altered
significantly.

The negative social and cultural problems
projected for the boon period of
construction never materialized in
expansions at Hinckley, Jay, or during
the construction of Maine Yankee at Wiscasset

2.

The culture and lifesytles of
residents of the project area will
be adversely affected by out-ofstate workers.
The more urban environments of
Hinckley, Jay and Wiscasset can
not accurately be compared to
the rustic Allagash area.

Fully 42 percent of the jobs resulting from
* 3.
construction would be taken by persons from outof state. In-state jobs that would be created
might well have a long-range negative impact to
the extent they would draw from other permanent,
vital industries and activities in Aroostook County,
such as potato farming which already has labor
4.
problems- A boom-town atmosphere would most certainly bring about problems in such areas as
alcohol and drug usage, and a resulting increase
in traffic accidents and fatalities. The State
would certainly have to anticipate a strain on
its social service agencies and there would be
additional stress on the State budget due to
welfare and unemployment demands during periods
of layoffs or work stoppages. These are elements
which cannot be measured, but which must be considered.

The bocm bust effect during the
construction phase would strain
housing, schools, roads,
utilities, cemeteries, and
other facilities in nearby towns.

Unless provisions are made, taxes
accruing to the involved townships
and the State would be lost;
amounting to $97,000 for forest
land and $40,000 to the Town of
Allagash.

*

B.

COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS (Continued)

b . 'JOB IMPACTS
PROS

CONS

1.

The construction inpact will last
eight years with peak employment of
1,900 people. The total wage and
salary bill is expected to be approximately $100 million- Fifty-eight
percent of the construction jobs are
expected to go to Maine residents
according to E . C . Jordan Study.

1.

Forty-two percent of the construction jobs
are expected to go non-residents.

2.

The average wages earned during
construction will be far higher
than those currently earned in the
region. According to the DavisBacon A c t , wages for construction
workers would equal those paid in
other Federal projects.

2.

The higher wages paid at the project could
raise the overall wage rates in the region.
This could adversely affect small farmers
and other small businesses that might not
be able to offer labor at the higher price.

3.

The construction bocm spending,
including the multiplier effect
would strengthen the economy of
Aroostook County and the Maine
econcmy as a whole.

3.

Maine's forest economy would be
negatively affected when 110,939
acres of forest land (impoundment,
buffer zone, and the transmission lines)
are taken out of production.

4.

Land east of the St. John which
now sends wood to Canada would be
cut off from Canadian markets and
would be more accessible to Maine
mills.

4.

206,000 acres of forest land would
be isolated from Maine wood markets.

The DOC Study also indicated that under
current market conditions the loss of this
would cost the State $58 million, (this was
discounted at 6%) in wages and salaries. The
actual loss could be even greater as new
uses (such as petrochemical feedstock) are
found for wood. The future value of this
wood resource cannot be predicted,
The job inpact from construction and operation of the Dickey-Lincoln School Project is
discussed in considerable detail in Attachment V .
A DCC Study found that the power
savings exceed the losses in income
to Maine people dependent on the
forest resource in the impoundment
area and the buffer zone.

c.
1.

FLOOD CONTROL
The project has flood control benefits. 1.
for the urban areas of Fort Kent,
other canmunities for rural farmlands
in the area which have been flooded in
the past after planting. The Army Corps
of Engineers has estimated the annual
value of these benefits to be $699,000.

There are less expensive and more direct
techniques for reducing flooding of the St.
John Valley. Dikes have recently been
built and have proven to be effective.
Other examples include insurance, flood
plain regulation, evacuation and a less
costly local dam.

C.

ENVIROMMENTAL IMPACTS

The sources of data examined for environmental impacts include the U . S . Army Corps of
Engineers Environmental Inpact Statements, numerous consultant and private individual
reports, state agency reviews, and a Corps contracted study with Normandeau Associates
examining mercury levels in Northern Maine streams, lakes, and fish.
Overall, from the standpoint of the stability and productivity of the existing natural
envrionment. the project will have an adverse inpact. The most significant impact will be
the loss of future productivity from over 80,000 acres of commercial forest land lost to
the impoundment and buffer zone. The project would also despoil one of the last remaining
wild areas and free-flowing rivers in the Eastern United States. The transmission lines will
cross undespoiled wild areas and rivers in Northern Maine. IN all, 0.6% of the state's
forest resources will be inundated, used for the buffer zone or removed for the transmission
line right-of-way. Another 1.1% of the state's forest land adjacent to the Canadian border
will be isolated fron the impoundment and made inaccessible from Maine.
White water canoeing and wilderness camping would be eliminated fron the project area.
The benefits of the man-made recreation attractions will largely depend on the investments in
facilities such as campsites, beaches, nature trails, etc., and the vagaries of the lake
fishery.
a.

TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEM
CONS

PROS
1.

Terrestrial habitat would be replaced
by aquatic, seasonally-flooded areas.

2.

The delta sites, caused by sediment
despotition at the mouths of tributaries
to the reservoirs, may be vegetated by
emergent wetland plants.

b.

FOREST RESOURCES

1.

A large volume of timber will be harvested during clearing of the impoundment
site, so that this portion of the forest
inventory cannot be considered as a loss.

1.

Project would inundate 88,000 plus
acres of terrestrail habitat.

1.

Some of the most productive forest lar.
in the watershed occur within the ares
are to be inundated.

2.

88,000 acres would be flooded by the
project. New transmission line rightof-ways and access roads would require
4,083 acres.

3.

13,400 acres of forest land would exis
as islands, being less accessible for
harvesting.

4.

An additional 206,000 acres of forest
land would be isolated from Maine wooc
industry markets.

C.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (Continued)

FOREST RESOURCES (Continued)
CONS
5.

Timber harvesting operations could also be
impacted by set-aside of additional forest
lands for fish and wildlife mitigation.

6.

Disruption of approximately 75 miles of
private forest access roads with resultant
increase in timber transportation costs.

7.

1.1% of the state's forest resource adjacent
to the Canadian border will be isolated by
the impoundment and made inaccessible from
Maine.

WILDLIFE
CONS

PROS
A temporary increase in seme animal
1.
populations such as small manmals and
deer, may occur due to the increased
understory/browse growth following clear
cutting and prior to flooding.

Conversion of approximately 88,000 acres of
terrestrial habitat to aquatic habitat will
result in concommitant loss of resident wild
life, as well as reductions in wildlife
using the site for a portion of the year
(e.g. whitetail deer wintering areas)

2.

It is projected that one-half of the deer in
23 townships of the St. John Region would be
affected due to loss of wintering areas to
the impoundment.

3.

Animal movements would be adversely affected
by the reservoir, particularly deer which
migrate between summer and winter ranges.

4.

Birds of prey such as osprey, hawks, and owl
would lose preferred habitats due to
flooding.

5.

Dickey Reservoirs would inundate 30
identified ponds and numerous beaver ponds.

FISHERIES
CONS

PROS
The U . S . Army Corps suggests an
investment of $5,000,000 to develop
a lake trout or salmon fishery.

1.

If the impoundment is built, 248 miles of
stream fishery for brook trout will be replaced by a lake fishery of unknown value.
To sustain a viable lake fishery for trout
or salmon will require development of a
hatchery supported by a permanent staff of
biologists. Corps has not specified where
and how hatchery would operate.

C.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (Continued)

FISHERIES (Cont'd)
PROS

CONS
3.

Fishing could be difficult at some acres of the
impoundment due to submerged tree stumps and
floating debris.

RECREATION
Day-use activities in the area
1.
would increase including swiniriing,
recreational boating, family
camping and sightseeing.

Swimming would be limited due to the very short
season. Boating would initially be limited due
to floating debris. All recreational usage would
be dependent on adequate provisions and investments in facilities.

2.

Whitewater canoeing would be eliminated in the
project area. The project site is one of the
few remaining wild areas in the Eastern United
States containing a free-flowing river.

3.

Wilderness type of camping will be eliminated
in the project area.

4.

Reduction of game populations, particularly deer,
would result in concentration of hunters in a
smaller area, carpeting for less game.

5.

Water level fluctuations associated with Lincoln
School reservior would seriously alter recreational use of the impoundment.

6.

A Corps of Engineers contract study by Normandeau
Associates, Inc., found thatmercury will accumulate to unacceptable levels (according to EPA
standards) in salmonoid fish in the impoundment.
This could prohibit Maine Inland Fish & Wildlife
fran promoting a fishery in the impoundment.

7.

The Maine Department of Environmental Protection
does not believe water quality will be as high in
the impoundment as the Corps of Engineers indicates. Water may be brownish in color and take
6-9 years to stabilize in quality.

8.

Lack of determination of recreation facility
costs and commitment to facility construction
makes determination of recreation and associated
economic benefits uncertain.

9.

Stressed tress at the edge of the impoundment
may be subject to disease, insect attack and
windthrow (blow-down) discouraging recreation.
Also discouraging recreation would be the 18,000
acre "ring" around the lake which will likely be
devoid of vegetation due to winter temperatures
and ice scouring in the spring.

C.
f.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (Continued)

LAND USES
PROS

CONS

1.

Extensive development of recreation
facilities at the Dickey irrpoiindment
could attract increased numbers of
transient visitors to the area.

1.

Known sand and gravel deposits receiving
sporadic use will be covered by the
iirpoundment.

2.

The impoundment would reduce peak
flood-flows downstream at the Fort
Kent damage center by 50 percent.

2.

The impoundment would cause rise of the
local ground water table with little impac
since residents are to be relocated.

3.

Eight archeological sites and one historic
site which appear eligible for inclusion i
the National Register, in addition to the
Big Black archeological site, which is
within the impoundment area and currently
included on the National Register.

4.

Approximately 75 miles of existing woodu
road network will be disrupted.

5.

Unless provisions are made, taxes accruing
to the involved townships and the state
would be lost, amounting to $97,000 for
forest land and $40,000 to the Town of
Allagash.

1.

The Maine Geological Society expressed
serious concern regarding insufficient dat
on the distribution of glacial sediments,
and bedrock geology in the vicinity of the
impoundments. This data is important in
determining the suitability of the selecte
sites to support the massive construction
which can sustain earthquakes or unstable
bedrock conditions.

g.

GEOLOGY AND SAFETY

1.

The current appropriation request in
the President's budget includes funds
to look into the geological conditions
further.

Maine is a State heavily dependent on petroleum for its energy
requirements. This dependence is depicted in Figure 1. The goal
of conservation must be to curb the extent to which we rely on petroleum
products. Figures 2 and 3 depict a 1935 scenario. Figure 2 depicts a
"business as usual" situation, and Figure 3, the situation if a vigorous
conservation program is pursued.
In view of the present virtual moratorium on new nuclear construction, the
1985 figures cannot shew the badly needed swing from petroleum dependence and,
thus, projects a situation very similar to 19 76 adjusted for
annual growth.

SOURCES OF MAINE ENERGY
1976

1985
"Business as
Usual"

1985
Optimum
Conservation Measures

Conservation simply makes good economic sense. It saves our resources,
contributes to our economic well-being, and reduces our dependence on foreign
oil with its devastating effect on inflation and our balance of payments.
Conservation is not necessarily doing without nor is it anti-industrial
development: It is using energy in the most efficient possible manner.

D. CONSERVATION

(Continued)

The following table depicts estimates by the State Office of Energy
Resources for annual savings from the following conservation measures in Maine
alone :
1-

Strict enforcement of the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit-

2.

Reduction of speed limit on primary interstate highways to 50-miles-per-hour.

3.

Weatherization.

4.

Thermostat set back.

P R E S E N T V O L U N T A R Y A L T E R N A T I V E S TO D I C K E Y - L I N C O L N

MEASURE

Barrels of Oil

Enforcement 55MPH Speed Limit

280,400

28%

12%

Reduce Speed to 50 MPH on
Primary Interstate Highways

802,400

78%

35%

4,600,000

498%

224%

840,000

90%
183%

40%

We a the ri za t i on
Thermostat Set Back to:
65° F
60° F

1,680,000

82%

These figures, although estimates, clearly depict the tremendous contribution of
conservation measures, and incidentally puts in perspective the modest power contribution
of the Dickey-Lincoln Project-

ATTACHMENT III

DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT

ENERGY DIMENSION

IS THE PROPOSED DICKEY-LINCOIN PROJECT A N OPTIMUM USE OF THE S T . JOHN RIVER RESOURCE?

This statement fetuses primarily on the energy dimension of the Dickey-Lincoln
Project although carments touch economic and environmental concerns as well since they are
inextricably woven together. The statement is brief, even though its conclusions are
based upon a thorough study of the project and many hours spent considering the long-term
duplications of the proposed development.
A t the outset, w e should recognize that this region is heavily dependent upon
limited supplies of foreign oil for its electric generation. New England depends upon
imported oil for 56% of its electric generating capacity. In Maine, that figure is
31%, soon to increase to 44% with the addition of the W . F . Wyman #4 unit at Cousins
Island. State, Regional, and National energy policies all call for decreased dependence
on oil through conservation and the development of alternatives with special attention
given to renewable sources of energy. The St. John River in Maine is an important
potential source of renewable hydroelectric energy that will almost certainly increase in
value in the future. This River is a state asset which could be very important to m i n e ' s
future. This is especially true for Northern and Eastern Maine which now depend upon
uncertain and expensive Canadian power for a major part of their electrical needs. As a
state resource, the River, if developed, ought to be developed in the best long-term
interests of the people of Maine, with adequate sensitivity to our regional responsibilities
There are serious questions as to whether the Dickey-Lincoln project, as it is now
designed, is, fron an energy point of view, in the best long-term interest of this
state. There is little question that the project is a feasible energy investment
over the long-run considering future price increases in nonrenewable energy resources.
It is questionable whether it is the best energy investment on the St. John River.
All the research done on the St. John River has not yet answered the question of what
is the best way to develop the S t . John River for hydroelectric power. We are faced
with the decision to either build or not build a particular project without full
knowledge of the alternative hydroelectric possibilities for that River.
The project under consideration (Dickey-Lincoln) is, from an energy point of view,
designed primarily, although not exclusively, as a peaking power project. This
might not be the best energy development for the St. John River. Preliminary investigations
by the Maine Office of Energy Resources of alternatives for the St. John suggest that there
could be base load oriented alternative hydroelectric development possibilities which
could prove to be superior for Maine frcm the economic, environmental and energy points of
view. A thorough study of base load hydroelectric alternatives for the St. John River shoulc
be undertaken before w e proceed with Dickey-Lincoln as it is now defined. The following
reasons are offered for this conclusion:
(1) Base load electric power is more important for economic development than is
peak power. A Maine oriented base load development on the St. John would be much more
important to Maine's long-term economic health than would Dickey-Lincoln.
(2) It is unlikely that the State of Maine could, in the foreseeable future, have
the need for the 900 M W peaking power to be produced at Dickey-Lincoln even if the
preference clause issue could be somehow resolved to make more power available in Maine.
(3) A base load oriented project may not require a new high voltage transmission
system routed through the wilderness of Northern Maine, thereby minimizing the environmental
impacts.

(4) Many electric systems in New England are either in the process of implementing
or considering implementing policies to encourage off-peak use of electricity. The
implications of such policies cannot be predicted at this time, although they will almost
certainly result in a diminished need for the type of high capacity peaking power to be
produced at Dickey-Lincoln.
(5) If sufficient nuclear or coal capacity is built in New England, then pumped
storage could be a more econcmical source of peaking power in New England.
(6) A Maine oriented base load project would likely require a smaller impoundment
than would the Dickey Project.
The Dickey-Lincoln Project, if built, will determine the use of over fifty miles of
an important river and over 88,000 acres of forest land for over 100 years. There
are important questions to be answered, and they should be answered even though further
time
resources might be expended. Fran Maine's energy point of view, the essential
question has not been addressed, and that is, "What is the best hydroelectric development
for the S t . John River?" It is not suggested that a final decision should be based
solely upon Maine's interests, but we should know the answer to this question before
the project is built.

ATTACHMENT IV
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"PREFERENCE

I

CLAUSE"

DICKEY-LINCOLN
"PREFERENCE CLAUSE"

Guidelines for marketing pcwer from federal hydroelectric projects are
set forth in Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of ]944 (16 U.S.C. 1970 ed.
Sec 825s) which says, among other things, that:
.. • "Preference in the sale of such power and energy shall
be given to public bodies and cooperatives."
There are at present nine (9) major preference customers in Maine, and
they purchased a combined total of 231 million kilowatt-hours in 1976.

Maine's

share of the Dickey-Lincoln output is estimated to be 533 million kilcwatt-hours.
The Power Marketing Analysis by the U.S. Department of Interior indicates that
preference customer load growth in Maine will be large enough to utilize Maine's
total share of the base load energy from Dickey-Lincoln.
It is unclear at this time what opportunities private utilities in Maine
(who serve the vast majority of the state's electrical customers) will have to
participate in the output from this project. Also unclear at this time is
whether preference customers outside of Maine will receive priority distribution
of the Dickey-Lincoln output before in-state private utilities are permitted
to participate.

NOTE: In 197 3, the voters of Maine overwhelmingly rejected a public power
proposal. This project imposes the public pcwer concept without providing the
citizens of Maine an opportunity to reverse this expression, no public
official should circumvent the position of a majority of the people once it
has been expressed at the ballot box.
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JOB IMPACTS
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF
DICKEY-LINCOLN
Jobs related to Dickey-Lincoln must be broken down between those during the
construction and those during operation of the project. Because the project creates
an energy facility with relatively small operational requirements, the number of jobs,
created during the operational phase will be much smaller than those created during
construction. The two phases are therefore considered separately.
I.

Construction

Construction of the Dickey-Lincoln Dams and associated transmission facilities
w i l l take approximately 8 years. During that time, the number of workers employed in
construction will vary from year-to-year, with different skills required at different
phases of the project. Because the work will be concentrated from the fourth through
the seventh year of construction, the Draft Environmental Inpact Statement (DEIS)
divides its estimates of employment into two periods: Years 1 through 3, plus Year
8; and Years 4 through 7.
Table 1 presents the total employment for Construction of Dickey-Lincoln and
the Transmission Lines (All references to employment on construction of the transmission
lines refers only to that employment building that portion of the lines in Maine. It
excludes employment building the lines in New Hampshire and Vermont)
TABLE I
Years 1 - 3 , and 8
Dickey-Lincoln
Transmission Lines
Total

278

Years 4-7
17C6
483
2191

278

(See footnotes, page 5)

Table 2 presents the DEIS estimates for the number of workers that can be
expected to come from the Aroostook County area, the rest of Maine, and outside of
Maine.
TABLE II
Aroostook County
Years 1 - 3 , 8
Years 4 - 7 *
Percent of Total

Rest of Maine

61
374**

81
501**

22%

29%

Total Maine
142
1141*

Out of State
136
1050*

52%

*

Includes Transmission Lines

**

Because the employment data in the DEIS on the transmission lines does not
distinguish between Aroostook County and the rest of Maine as the DickeyLincoln DEIS does, these figures are for the Dickey-Lincoln dams only.

It should be noted that the methodology used to estimate the number of jobs
which will go to Maine and Aroostook County residents may overstate the number of
jobs in these categories, especially in the case of Aroostook County. The DEIS
based these estimates on the availability of skills in the various categories required
by Dickey-Lincoln in Aroostook County and Maine, and assumed that where there was
unemployment in a skill, those unemployed in the local area would be hired first. For
example, if carpenters were needed, those unemployed carpenters looking for work in
Aroostook County would be hired first, then carpenters fron outside of Aroostook
County- There is a further assumption that the r e m i n d e r o£ carpenters would ccme
from Maine.
This method probably overstates the situation with regard to local hires because
there is no guarantee that jobs will go to unemployed individuals. Those currently
employed at the time of the project may seek to work there because of the relatively
high wage rates (See below)
Thus, those who find work at Dickey-Lincoln will be
first-care, first-hired based, of course, on experience. There would b e no way to
assure that Aroostook County, or even Maine residents in general, will be hired
in the proportions indicated. However, the DEIS projections on hiring Maine
residents may be "in the ballpark" since the remoteness of the Dickey-Lincoln site
will not encourage many out-of-state residents to cone seeking employment there.
Thus, this paper will continue to use an approximate figure of 52% hired frcm Maine.
Despite the uncertainty which surrounds these figures in Table II, it can be said
with seme confidence that the Aroostook County area will contribute primarily laborers
to the project, with a variety of skilled workers (carpenters, electricians, painters,
plumbers, millwrights, iron workers, etc.) ccming frcm Aroostook County or the rest
of Maine. Operating Engineers and Teamsters are the largest skilled categories
requiring out-of-state workers.
Table III presents the estimated total wage and salary income which can be expected
frcm the project. In this table, net income is defined as gross income less 30%
for state and federal taxes, and personal benefit contributions.

Dickey-Lincoln
Transmission Lines
Total

TABLE III
Gross Inccme

Net Income

Net Inccme to
Maine Workers

Net Inccme to Out
of State Workers

99,450,000

69,150,000

35,503,650

33,646,350

8,000,000

5,610,000

3,100,000

2,500,000

107,450,000

74,769,000

38,136,500

35,963,500

Table IV presents annual averages and totals of net wage and salary income
for the two major periods of construction.

TABLE IV
Years 1-3,8
Total

Maine

Years 4-7*
Total

Maine

Total
for Period

$11,306,025

$5,766,073

$62,536,740

$32,519,105

Annual A v g .

$ 2,826,506

$ 1,441,518

$15,634,185

$ 8,129,776

Includes Transmission Line Construction

These income estimates are based on wage rates which must, by federal law,
be no less than other federal wages in the area for skill categories required.
This means that the average hourly wage across all skill categories for DickeyLincoln will be approximately $8.00. This is roughly 130% higher than the current
wage levels in these categories in Aroostook County. The unskilled hourly wage
rate will probably be around $5.00 an hour, almost triple the current wage rate on
farming in the area. These wage rates will certainly attract job seekers from a
much wider area than Aroostook County.
The effect on unemployment in the Fort Kent-Allagash region is likely to be
minimal. If all the currently unemployed people in the Fort Kent area in the
various skill categories required by Dickey-Lincoln were hired for the project, the
unemployment rate in the area would drop approximately 25%, from 9% to 7%. However,
as indicated above, this is not likely to be the case.
In fact, the history of major projects in remote areas such as Dickey-Lincoln
has shown that unemployment rates in the local area actually tend to rise during
construction. This is due to the large number of workers who come to the area
seeking employment but not finding it, or finding it only for relatively short
periods but remaining on the chance of working again. There may also be high
seasonal unemployment in the area, since most of the work must be done during the
summer. Overall, therefore, there is not likely to be any significant betterment of
the unemployment rate frcm construction of Dickey-Lincoln.

Secondary employment frcm construction of Dickey-Lincoln is difficult to
estimate. The DEIS makes a projection of 500-600 in Aroostook County, using a
multiplier of 1.55. However, the DEIS is based on the erroneous assumption that
remote areas have higher multipliers. In fact, the opposite is true. Because remote
areas have relatively fewer goods and services to offer, money earned in construction job
will probably be saved and then taken out of the area when the worker leaves. There will
certainly be secondary employment in the area created by Dickey-Lincoln, but it is likely
to be much less than the 500-600 jobs projected in the DEIS.

There are likely to be several negative effects in Aroostook County as a result
of Dickey-Lincoln. The most significant of these negative effects will probably be
the inflation in wage rates brought about by the legally-required high wage rates at
the project. The effect will be most severe on the availability of agricultural workers
in Aroostook County, although it may not be a direct effect of Dickey-Lincoln jobs.
That is, some farm laborers will seek jobs working on Dickey-Lincoln, but only a few
will be hired relative to the total number of farm workers. However, as DickeyLincoln pulls other non-skilled workers frcm Aroostook County because of its high
wage rates, farm workers may seek other non-skilled jobs thus left vacant. The
higher wage rates of Dickey—Lincoln may thus drive the price of non—skilled labor to
the point where seme small farmers cannot afford the price of labor and will be
driven out of business. It is not clear, however, hew many farmers would be affected.
Other employers of non-skilled, and skilled workers in Aroostook County will also
see their labor prices rising, with a resulting spread of general inflation throughout
the labor market. This may also affect small contractors and other firms adversely,
though again it is difficult to estimate the exact number.
It should also be noted that there will be a large influx of dollars into the area
economy frcm the wages and salaries and from any locally-purchased supplies. This
will lead to an inflationary situation in the local economy which will degrade the
real inccmes of existing residents, and may induce a local wage-price spiral for the
four years of peak activity at the dams.
II.

Operation
Job impacts during the Operation phase will be derived fron three primary sources:

(1) Jobs operating and maintaining the dams and power facilities. The DEIS
estimates that there would be 68 such jobs, 60 of which would be filled from area
residents. This is, of course, a relatively small addition to the area work force,
and would not generate significant secondary employment opportunities.
(2) Jobs created as a result of economic development engendered by the
electricity made available by the power generating facilities.
The creation of such jobs is highly1 speculative. It would depend on the
extent of utilization of Dickey-Lincoln s intermediate power for industrial use.
This is impossible to predict at this time. It is conceivable that the
electric systems in the state could make full use of the intermediate power to
be generated, leaving none left over for econcmic development, but it is probable
that at least seme power would be available for development.
(3) The jobs lost in the forest harvesting industry from the flooding of the
impoundment area.
Again, it is very difficult to predict how many jobs would be lost from the
impoundment area flooding. A Department of Conservation report estimated that there
would be a loss of $990,617,000 in value added frcm the lost forest resources, part
of this value added is wages and salaries, although it is not possible to make on
exact determination of wages and salaries lost from this figure.

However, it is likely that at most, if not all, those who would be
employed cutting in the impoundment area would find employment in other areas of the
woods; this is especially likely if more intensive use of the forest resources is
made over the remainder of the century.

Footnotes
1.

U . S . Army, Corps of Engineers,
New England Division
Draft Environmental Impact Statement,
Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes, Appendix H .
Waltham, Massachusetts: 1977

2.

U . S . Department of Energy,
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes
Transmission Project
Bangor, Maine: 1977
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POTENTIAL CANADIAN POWER PURCHASES IN RELATION TO DICKEY -LINCOLN

The Canadians have indicated an interest in selling electric power to the United
States.
CLASSES OF TRANSACTIONS
There are three classes of transactions for electric power potentially available
at this time.
I.

Firm Capacity Power
New Brunswick is now constructing a nuclear plant at Point LePreau on the
Atlantic Coast. They have indicated an interest in negotiating for 150
MW of base load power. This could possibly be purchased by a Maine utility
for a fixed period of t i m e , perhaps 15-20 years. Maine utilities through
NEPOOL may be considering such purchases. It is Canadian Government policy
to limit the duration of such contracts so that the power could be available
later as Canadian needs grow to meet their expanded capacity. Such contracts
allow the Canadians to take advantage of the economies of scale of large
plants without forever giving up ownership and use of these larger plants.
The Canadians have also indicated a willingness to sell electric capacity
from the following very large facilities:
Churchill Falls, Labrador
5225 M W , in service since 197*4. Most of output from Labrador to Quebec,
a provincial transfer, a small fraction staying in Labrador. Quebec
then transfers some power to New York (PASNY).
James B a y , Quebec
10,000+ M W , $15.2 billion cost. This project has been under construction
since 1 9 7 4 , and is due for completion in stages between. 1980 and 1985.
Gull Island, Labrador
1800 MW nominal capacity, $2.9 billion construction cost, half of which
is for "the transmission lines to Newfoundland. Generating station cost
about $1.5 billion. Part of the output is for Newfoundland, the balance
w i l l go to Quebec. A private corporation, the Lower Churchill Development
Corporation, w i l l be set up later this year and they will be responsible
for marketing the power from Gull Island.

II.

Seasonal Diversity Transfers
Seasonal Diversity Transfers are transfers of pcwer between areas that experience
different seasonal peaks. For example, Quebec is a winter peaking system and
is currently selling capacity to New York during the summer-since New York
is a summer peaking system. New England, on the other h a n d , is a winter peaking
system at this time. Therefore, this seasonal diversity power does not appear
to be particularly useful to New England.

Hcwever, it is possible that summer peaking might be worth looking into from
Maine's point of view in the long run. Summer's experience with low head hydro
indicates that production can be significantly affected during dry summer periods.
If Maine could purchase power from Canada during the summer, this might make low
head hydro development more attractive to Maine. This is a possibility that w e
shall continue to pursue in our assessment of low head hydro potential. Preliminary discussions with Hydro Quebec indicate that a significant amount of
summer capacity could be available. However, this class of power is not a
specific alternative to Dickey-Lincoln.
III. Economy Energy
Quebec is largely dependent on hydro for its electric generation. The amount
of hydroelectric energy they generate varies throughout the year depending
upon water availability. They are interested in selling surplus energy from
their system "when it happens to be available." This type of "incidental"
energy cannot be depended upon t o -supply new capacity needs.
However, this type of energy is worth looking into further, as it is sold at
discount prices and can be used to save oil and cut back on production at more
expensive plants. This type of transaction is worth purchasing with the
objective of possibly decreasing the price of electricity, but not as a source
of new generation capacity such as Dickey-Lincoln.
COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
It should be noted that we do not know what the specific economics of these suggested
transactions would be at this time, and there are questions with regard to the long
term availability of such power. Some of the uncertainty regarding Canadian purchases
stems from the fact that contracts are controlled by both the Federal and Provincial
Governments.
The Canadian Government, through the National Energy Board, regulates the exportation
of electricity from Canada. The National Energy Board, in considering an application
to export power, must satisfy itself that the quantity of energy to be exported is
surplus over reasonably foreseeable Canadian requirements, and that the price to be
charged is reasonable in relation to the public interest. In addition, the Board
is required to consider all matters that appear to be relevant, giving them a fairly
broad mandate.
To ensure that an export price is just and reasonable, the Board has developed three
criteria that the price mist meet. Firstly, it must cover fully the cost of energy
to be exported. Secondly, it must not be less than the price to Canadians for
comparable service. Thirdly, it should not be markedly less than the least-cost
alternative available to the foreign purchaser.
TRANSMISSION
The only direct connection fcJr Maine to the Canadian System is one line through New
Brunswick. This line has the capacity to accommodate the 150 MW of the Point LePreau
plant if some Maine utility does decide to purchase that capacity. Further increases
in power exchange could well mean new transmission systems. This whole question of
transmission needs to be looked into further at the point at which we might begin
rare specific planning in terms of the importation of power from Canada. It is
possible that the Dickey-Lincoln project could in fact facilitate the purchase of
Canadian Power by virtue of the transmission system which would be underutilized
during off peak hours.

VERMONT TRANSACTIONS
Vermont is negotiating with Quebec a short term arrangement to fill gaps for the ne>^:
few y e a r s , and a longer term agreement to transmit power to NEPOOL for New England
consumption. Hcwever, no agreement has -been signed between Vermont and Quebec.
SUMMARY
There is a possibility of purchasing nuclear power from Point LePreau. This could
be similar to Maine's share of Dickey-Lincoln power. However, we would not be able
to undertake a comparison of the economics until the completion of negotiations for
the pcwer.
It is also worth noting that a Point LePreau purchase might be advisable for
Maine even if base load power were available from Dickey-Lincoln for Maine.
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SMALL HYDRO ALTERNATIVES

We have completed the first phase of an inventory of existing dams in Maine
and have indentified about 2,000 dams. Data relating to these dams has been
submitted to the U . S . Army Corps of Engineers for analysis as part of the New
England River Basins Commission Hydro Power Study. Preliminary results to date,
fron this first phase inventory are very encouraging and indicate a substantial
availability in terms of numbers and dispersal of sites, potential capacity, and
energy production.
This inventory is the first step in assessing the hydro power potential of
Maine's existing dams. We will new proceed to phase two with successive stages
of screening and evaluation of the identified sites.
Results of the ccmputer analysis of inventory data of 546 dams initially
analyzed indicate that 229 of the undeveloped (non-generating) dams or about
42% of the total have a potential for 50 KW or more of generating capacity and
need further evaluation.
The average capability of these dams is falling in the one-three megawatt
range. These numbers are very preliminary, but give SOXVB indication of the
magnitude of the resource that we are pursuing.
In the final analysis, the amount of hydro power brought on-line in Maine
will be influenced by economics, institutional restraints, recreational concerns,
and the ever-increasing magnitude of environmental impacts.
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Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Benefit-Cost Summary
(

Hydroelectric P r o j e c t , St. John R i v e r , M a i n e , U.S. Array Corps of Engineers
(March 1977 Price Levels)

DAMS
T o t a l Investment
C o n s t r u c t i o n Cost of Dams
I n t e r e s t During Construction
P r e s e n t w o r t h of future recreation
facilities
Total
C a p i t a l Recovery Factory

6-3/8%

3-1/4%

(Dams)

8-1/2%*

$544,000,000
56,600,000

$544,000,000

111,000,000

$544,000,000
143,110,000

236,000
$600,836,000

170,000
$655,170,000

136,313
$692,246,000

.03383

.06388

.08502

20,356,000
2,100,000
4,380,000
315,000
142,000
193,000
$ 27,486,000

41,852,000
2,100,000
4,380,000

58,859,477
2,100,000
4,380,000

166,000

101,000

142,000
136,000
$ 48,776,000

142,000
122,000**
$ 65,704,000

$146,300,000
10,410,000
$156,710,000

$146,300,000
20,920,000
$167,220,000

$146,300,000
28,400,000
$174,700,000

6,950,000
3,650,000

$ 11,610,000
3,650,000

$ 14,854,179
3,650,000

-390,000
$ 10,210,000

-450,000
$ 14,810,000

-4 76.000
$ 18,028,000

$690,300,000
67,010^000
236_j 000
$757,546,000

$690,300,000

$690,300,000
176,510,000
136,000
$866,946,000

A n n u a l Costs
I n t e r e s t and A m o r t i z a t i o n
O p e r a t i o n and Maintenance
P u m p i n g Power (43S,000,000 kwh x $.010)
M a j o r Replacements
L o s s of Land Taxes
L o s t recreational opportunities
Subtotal Dans
.RANSMISSION LIKES
Total Investment
Construction Costs of Transmission L i n e
I n t e r e s t During Construction
Total
A n n u a l Costs
I n t e r e s t and A m o r t i z a t i o n
O p e r a t i o n and Maintenance
R e d u c t i o n - future wheeling by others;
Granite—Essex
Subtotal Transmission
TOTAL P R O J E C T
T o t a l Investment
Cons truction
Interest During Construction
P r e s e n t Worth - future recreation
Total
^ourcc:

131,920,000
170,000
$822,390,000

Table 1.07, "Economic Data," Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Environmental
Impact Statemen t (U'althaa, MA: Corps of Engineers, A u g u s t , 1977), p p . 1 - 2 3 , L .

•Computed following Army Corps procedures by Lawrence G . H i n e s , Economics D e p a r t m e n t ,
Dartmouth Col l o g o , ll.inover, N . U . 0 3 7 5 5 .
**Includcs cstim.uo of $1'»,500 Tor loss during construction.

D i c k e y - L i n c o l n School Lakes Benefit-Cost Summary
(Continued)
3-1/4%
Annual Costs

6-3/8%

8-1/2%

$ 37,696,000

$ 63,586,000

$ 83,732,000

$ 23,703,000

$ 23,703,000

$ 23,703,000

36,750,000

36,750,000

36,750,000

4,699,000
6,758,000

4,699,000
6,758,000

4,699,000
6,758,000

3,500,000

3,500,000

3,500,000

$ 75,410,000

$ 75,410,000

$ 75,410,000

172,000

145,000

133,000

1,691,000

2,689,000

3,198,000

696,000

686,000

686,000

TOTAL A N N U A L B E N E F I T S

$ 77,969,000

$ 78,930,000

$ 79,427,000

TOTAL A N N U A L

$ 37,696,000

$ 63,586,000

$ 83^732,000

Annual Benefits
P e a k i n g Power (15.4% Capicity

Factor)

874,000 kw x .904 x $ 3 0 . 0 0
1,182,600,000 kwh x .914 x $.034
Intermediate P o w e r (42.9% Capacity Factor)
70,000 kw x .980 x $ 6 8 . 5 0
262,800,000 k w h x .989 x $.026
Downstream
350,000,000 kwh x $.010
Subtotal P o w e r
Recreation
Redevelopment
Prevention of Flood

Damages

COSTS

BENEFIT-COST RATIO

2.1 to 1

1.2 to 1

1.

Cost of p u m p b a c k energy is included in project A n n u a l O p e r a t i o n and
Maintenance Costs.

2.

The .904 and .914 e t c . factors noted in power b e n e f i t analysis r e f l e c t
estimated r e d u c t i o n in capacity and energy outputs due to transmission
line l o s s e s .
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*The 6-3/8 e n t r y for ''prevention of flood damages has b e e n used instead
of r e f i g u r i n g a t 8-1/22 b e c a u s e the change is i n s i g n i f i c a n t .

0.95 to 1 '

(Continued)

At 8*5%, the Dickey-Lincoln project costs more than it returns in
benefits. T h a t is, a ratio of 0.95 to 1 means that Dickey-Lincoln
produces only 95 cents value for every dollar expended. (The 8%% rate
was chosen because it is approximately the market prime interest rate
in raid 1978.) Moreover, if such questionable project credits as
redevelopment and downstream benefits are disallowed, the benefit-cost
ratio is 0 . 8 7 to 1 . Finally, if taxes are acknowledged as a cost by
adopting the 5.1% adjustment used by the Federal Power Commission in
its studies, t h e benefit-cost ratio for the Dickey-Lincoln project
drops to 0 . 6 7 to 1.
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